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Abstract
In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and
governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups,
less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers
understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares
important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrates that
perceivers are sometimes willing to attribute a mental state to a group as a whole even when they are not willing to
attribute that mental state to any of the individual members of the group, suggesting that perceivers can reason about the
beliefs and desires of group agents over and above those of their individual members. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the
degree of activation in brain regions associated with attributing mental states to individuals—i.e., brain regions associated
with mentalizing or theory-of-mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and
precuneus—does not distinguish individual from group targets, either when reading statements about those targets’
mental states (directed) or when attributing mental states implicitly in order to predict their behavior (spontaneous).
Together, these results help to illuminate the processes that support understanding group agents themselves.
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Introduction
In domains ranging from the economy to national security,
large-scale decisions often involve judgments about the machina-
tions of a group agent, such as a terrorist organization,
government, or corporation. Sometimes, judgments about a group
agent simply reduce to judgments about one or more of its
individual members (for example, thinking about whether or not a
country is hiding nuclear weapons may primarily involve
consideration of that country’s leader). However, people also
sometimes appear to make judgments about a group by treating it
as an entity in and of itself. Individuals assign moral blame and
punishment to whole organizations [1], interpret laws by looking
for the ‘intentions’ of the legislature [2], may get into financial
trouble by reasoning about the ‘mind’ of the market [3], and, in a
recent decision by the United States Supreme Court, extended
rights typically granted to individuals to a corporation as a whole
[4].
Although an abundance of research has investigated the effects
of group membership on how people perceive and reason about
the minds of individual people (for recent reviews, see [5–7], less is
known about how perceivers reason about the ‘mind’ of a group
agent itself [8]. To investigate this question, the present work uses
a combination of behavioral and fMRI approaches to examine the
extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole
shares important properties and processes with understanding the
minds of individuals. Specifically, we ask (1) to what extent people
sometimes reason about the beliefs and intentions of a group agent
separately from those of the groups’ members and (2) to what
extent brain regions associated with understanding individuals also
support understanding group agents.
In order to predict or understand the behavior of a single
individual, perceivers often appeal to that individual’s mental states
(i.e., his or her thoughts, beliefs, intentions, desires, and feelings).
This capacity to ascribe mental states to others—that is, to
mentalize [9,10] or engage theory-of-mind [11,12]—reveals itself in
the words perceivers use when talking about other people. For
example, we can say that Dick thought he was aiming for a
partridge and never intended to shoot his friend. Words like think,
believe, feel, intend, want, and plan all refer to the inner contents
of other minds, allowing perceivers to speak about the purported
underlying causes of others’ behavior even as they diverge from
that behavior itself [13,14]. In turn, inferences about these internal
causes guide moral decisions about how others should be treated,
including the extent to which they deserve praise or punishment
[15,16].
Over the past two decades, an abundance of neuroimaging
research has linked mentalizing or theory-of-mind to a consistent
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set of brain regions, including the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus/posteri-
or cingulate, sometimes collectively called the ‘theory-of-mind
network’. Using carefully controlled tasks that aim to isolate
theory-of-mind, these regions show preferential engagement when
people are thinking about humans versus other entities [17–24]
and when people are thinking about humans’ minds versus their
other aspects, such as their physical attributes [21,25–27].
Although much of this evidence has been correlational, recent
work using TMS has demonstrated a causal role for the Right TPJ
(RTPJ) in the use of mental state information for moral judgment
[15], and research on individuals with damage to MPFC and TPJ
has demonstrated a role for those regions in the ability to make
inferences about others’ mental states [28,29].
Intriguingly, mental state words pervade perceivers’ statements
not only about individuals but also about groups. In recent news
reports, we learn that ‘‘Apple thinks carefully about its entire
product lineup’’ [30], that ‘‘Apple wants owners to sell their old
iPhones back to the company for a discount on a new phone’’ [31],
and that ‘‘Apple intends to work with record labels to identify and
promote up and coming artists’’ [32]. In cases like these, people
apply words normally associated with the psychological states of an
individual person—words like ‘thinks’, ‘wants’, and ‘intends’—to a
corporation as a whole. These same expressions can also be
applied to other sorts of group agents. People talk about what a
government agency ‘intends’, what a religious organization
‘thinks’, or what a sports team ‘loves’ or ‘hates’ [33–37]. Indeed,
archival studies show that people speak about groups using mental
state words spontaneously, even outside the context of an
experiment [36], and cross-cultural studies document the use of
mental state words in descriptions of groups not only in the West,
but also in East Asian cultures [35,37].
Does the use of such language indicate that people understand
governments and other organizations by attributing mental states
to a group? Critically, there are two different senses in which one
might think about ‘groups’ and, accordingly, two different senses
in which one might investigate the processes perceivers use to
understand groups. On one hand, one could think about a ‘group’
as referring to the members of groups. If each group member is a
human being, then the group is simply a collection of human
beings. A first sense in which one might investigate how perceivers
understand groups, then, is to investigate how people understand
collections of human beings. On the other hand, one could think
about a ‘group’ as referring to a group agent [38,39]. A group
agent itself is not merely a collection of separate human beings but,
instead, an entity with whatever sort of status attaches itself to
corporations, nations, and sports teams. Thus, a second sense in
which one might investigate how perceivers understand groups is
to investigate how people understand not collections of individuals,
but group agents.
An example highlights the distinction between a group in the
sense of a collection of individuals and a group in the sense of a
group agent. Consider the sentence ‘‘The employees and
stockholders of Acme Corp. are all in debt.’’ This sentence says
something about the financial condition of various individual
human beings while making no claims about the financial
condition of the corporation with which they are associated. In
other words, the sentence ascribes a property to the members
without ascribing that property to the group agent itself. By
contrast, consider the sentence, ‘‘Acme Corp. is in debt.’’ This
sentence says something about the financial condition of a
corporation, but it makes no claims at all about the financial
condition of any individual human beings. (The corporation itself
could be in debt even if all of the employees and stockholders were
in excellent financial shape.) Thus, this sentence ascribes a
property to a group agent without ascribing that same property
to any of the members.
Existing work already provides some evidence for the claim
thinking about groups in the first sense—i.e., thinking about
collections of human beings—shares properties and processes with
thinking about individual people. Behaviorally, the vast literatures
on stereotypes and intergroup relations show that people are
willing to ascribe psychological attributes to whole collections of
others [7,40–45], and studies indicate that some of the same
principles that apply to the ascription of properties to individual
agents also appear in the ascription of properties to whole
collections of agents [46,47]. Moreover, a recent neuroimaging
study observed activation in brain regions associated with theory-
of-mind—MPFC, TPJ, and precuneus—when participants evalu-
ated the applicability of certain preferences both to individual
people and to collections of individuals, compared to a non-mental
control condition [48]. Taken together, these behavioral and
neuroimaging studies provide support for the view that people can
ascribe psychological attributes not only to individual human
beings but also to collections of human beings, and that they may
use similar processes to do so (even if the outcomes of those
processes may sometimes differ [47,49]).
Yet studies like these still leave open the question of how people
understand groups in the second sense—i.e., how they understand
group agents. As we saw above, people can ascribe a non-mental
property to all of the members of a group agent without ascribing
that property to the group agent itself (‘‘All of the employees and
stockholders are in debt’’). Similarly, perhaps people can ascribe a
mental property (i.e., a mental state) to all of the members of a
group without in any way ascribing these states to the group agent
itself (‘‘The employees and stockholders all love Jeopardy!’’). We
have also seen that people can ascribe a non-mental property to a
group without ascribing that property to the individual members
(‘‘Acme Corp. is in debt.’’). Similarly, perhaps people can ascribe
mental states to a group agent without ascribing that state to any of
the members. Indeed, recent research suggests that the more
people perceive a ‘group mind’, the less they tend to perceive the
minds of the members of that group [8,50].
With this in mind, the current studies investigate how perceivers
understand group agents by examining the extent to which
understanding group agents shares important properties and
processes with understanding individuals. Experiment 1 examines
behaviorally the extent to which people ascribe mental states to
group agents over and above attributions of mental states to their
individual members. Experiment 2 uses fMRI to investigate the
extent to which understanding and predicting the behavior of
group agents recruits brain regions associated with understanding
and predicting the behavior of individuals—i.e., brain regions
associated with theory of mind.
Experiment 1: Ascriptions to group agents vs.
ascriptions to group members
When people use sentences that appear to ascribe mental states
to a group agent, are they actually ascribing something to the
group agent, or are they merely attributing something to the
group’s members? For example, consider the sentence, ‘‘United
Food Corp. believes that the new policy is morally unacceptable.’’
At least on the surface, this sentence appears to attribute a mental
state (the belief that the policy is morally unacceptable) to a group
agent (United Food Corp). However, it is possible that this is just a
linguistic shortcut, and that when people use or hear sentences like
Theory-Of-Mind and Group Agents
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this one, they are really attributing mental states to the members of
the group, not to the group itself.
Existing research demonstrates that people sometimes do use
sentences that appear to attribute a property to a group when
referring to its members, specifically when the members of the
group have the particular property in their roles as group members
[39]. For example, if each member of the Sigma Chi fraternity gets
drunk, and if each of them does so in his role as a Sigma Chi
member, people tend to agree with the sentence, ‘‘The Sigma Chi
fraternity got drunk’’ [39]. This sentence appears on the surface to
be ascribing a property to the fraternity itself—the actual
organization— but is in fact just a shorthand way of ascribing a
property to the individual members in their roles as members.
In Experiment 1, we examine whether apparent mental state
attributions to group agents can involve attributions of a property
to a group agent itself, or whether they reduce to attributions to
individual group members. To the extent that perceivers genuinely
attribute a property to the group agent itself, attributions to group
agents should sometimes diverge from attributions to the members
of those groups. That is, we should observe (a) cases in which
perceivers attribute a mental state to all of the members of the
group without attributing that state to the group agent itself and (b)
cases in which perceivers attribute a mental state to the group
agent without attributing that state to any of the group’s members.
In contrast, to the extent that apparent attributions to group
agents are merely shorthand for attributions to the group
members, participants should not attribute properties to the group
agent that they do not also attribute to the members of the group.
Thus, finding that individuals attribute mental states to a group
agent without attributing that state to any of the group’s members
would be the most unambiguous evidence that perceivers can
apply mental states to group agents themselves.
Method
Participants. 116 Yale students and faculty (33% female; age
range 18-54, mean age 21 years) were recruited outside a dining
hall to fill out a questionnaire for payment.
Ethics statement. This study was approved by the Institu-
tional Review Board at Yale University. All participants provided
written informed consent.
Materials and Procedure. This experiment used a 2
(mental state: individual-only or group-only) 6 3 (question: any
member, each member, group) design in which target was
manipulated within-subject and question type was manipulated
between subjects. Each participant received eight vignettes in
counterbalanced order. Four vignettes were designed in such a
way that it would be logically possible to ascribe a particular
mental state to each of the individuals in the group without
ascribing that state to the group itself (Individual-only condition).
For example, one vignette described an organization devoted to
fighting the death penalty. All of the members of this anti-death
penalty organization are also interested in antebellum American
history, so they decide to form a separate organization, with
exactly the same members, called the Shady Grove Antebellum
Historical Society (SGAHS), which meets to discuss historical
questions. If participants are willing to ascribe a mental state to all
of the individual members without ascribing that mental state to
the group as a whole, participants should report that all of the
members of SGAHS want to fight the death penalty but that the
SGAHS itself does not want to fight the death penalty. On the
other hand, to the extent that attributions to a group simply reduce
to the attributions made to the individual members, participants
should report that SGAHS does want to fight the death penalty.
The other four vignettes were designed such that that it would
be logically possible to ascribe a mental state to the group itself
without ascribing that state to any of the individual members
(Group-only condition). For example, one vignette described a
large organization that was commissioned to build a space shuttle.
Some members of the organization put together the software,
others build the exterior, still others are in charge of the fuel, and
so forth. But there is no single person who works on every aspect of
the project. To the extent that people are willing to ascribe a
property to a group agent over and above its members,
participants should say that the organization knows how to build
a space shuttle, but the individual members do not. In another
vignette, a Community Association needs to choose music for an
upcoming event. Some members really want to play punk music
and can’t stand classical, others really want to play classical music
but strongly dislike punk, so in the end, the Association selects a
third option: classic rock. If people are willing to attribute
properties to group agents over and above their members,
participants should say that the Community Association itself
preferred playing classic rock but that none of the individual
members shared this preference. On the other hand, to the extent
that attributions to the group simply reduce to the attributions
made to the individual members, participants should report either
that most or all of the individual members prefer playing classic
rock or that the group itself does not prefer playing classic rock.
For full texts of the vignettes, see (Text S1).
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three
question conditions: ‘any member,’ ‘each member,’ or ‘group.’
Participants in the ‘any member’ condition received after each
vignette a question about whether any individual member of the
group had a particular mental state (‘Do any of the members of the
Community Association prefer the idea of playing classic rock to
the idea of playing every other type of music?’). Participants in the
‘each member’ condition were asked whether each member had
the relevant state (‘Do each of the individual members of the
Community Association prefer…?’). Finally, participants in the
‘group’ condition received questions about whether the group itself
had the relevant state (‘Does the Community Association
prefer…?’). Each question was answered on a scale from 1 (‘No’)
to 7 (‘Yes’).
Results
Two participants failed to complete all items of the question-
naire. We calculated the mean response to ‘group’, ‘any member’,
and ‘each member’ questions in the ‘Members Only’ vignettes and
the ‘Group Only’ vignettes for the remaining participants (see
Fig. 1). To the extent that participants attributed purported
mental states to group agents themselves, we should observe both
cases in which participants attribute a state to all of the members
of the group without attributing that state to the group itself and,
most critically, cases in which participants attribute a state to the
group itself without attributing that state to any of the individual
members. See (Table S1) for complete dataset.
For the Members-Only vignettes, a one-way ANOVA revealed
a significant effect of question condition, F(2, 114) = 41.2, p ,
.001, g2 = .42 (Fig. 1), such that participants were willing to
attribute states to some or all of the members of a group without
attributing those states to the group itself. Tukey’s posthoc tests
showed that participants agreed less with ascriptions in the ‘group’
question condition than in either the ‘any member’ question
condition, p, .001, or the ‘each member’ question condition, p,
.001, suggesting that attributions to the group did not simply
reduce to attributions to the group’s members.
Theory-Of-Mind and Group Agents
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 August 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 8 | e105341
Critically, for the Group-Only vignettes, a one-way ANOVA
again revealed a significant effect of question condition on
participants’ responses, F(2, 114) = 91.6, p , .001, g2 = .62
(Fig. 1), such that participants were willing to attribute states to the
group itself that they did not attribute to any of the members of the
group. Tukey’s posthoc tests showed that participants agreed more
with ascriptions in the ‘group’ question condition than in either the
‘any member’ question condition, p , .001, or the ‘each member’
question condition, p , .001. Moreover, participants’ responses in
the group question condition were significantly above the neutral
midpoint of the scale, p , .001, indicating that participants were
genuinely endorsing sentences ascribing mental states to group
agents. These results suggest that attributions to the group agent
were made over and above the attributions made to individual
members.
This study explored the relationship between ascribing states to
group agents and their members. We observed cases in which
participants attributed a state to all of the members but did not
attribute that state to the group itself and also cases in which
participants attributed a state to the group itself but did not
attribute the state to any of the members. Together, these results
demonstrate that mental state ascriptions to a group agent can
diverge from those made to the group’s individual members,
suggesting that perceivers can attribute a property of some sort to
the group agent itself.
Experiment 2: Neural processes supporting
mental state ascriptions to group agents
Experiment 1 suggests that that when people use expressions of
the form ‘United Food Corp. wants.’, they appear to be ascribing
something to the group itself, rather than to the members of the
group. However, a further question concerns the processes
supporting these ascriptions. That is, although such statements
clearly involve the same linguistic expressions that people use
when applying theory-of-mind to individual human beings, to
what extent do they also involve the same cognitive processes?
To investigate the processes supporting attributions of purport-
ed mental states to group agents, we scanned participants using
fMRI as they considered the mental states of individuals and
groups. In one task, participants read sentences that referred
explicitly to the mental states of groups and individuals (along with
matched, non-mental control sentences). In a second task,
participants carried out a procedure that relied on mental state
ascription incidentally, without the use of mental state words:
making predictions about what an individual or group would do in
a variety of situations. To the extent that perceivers rely on
processes associated with understanding individuals when they
understand and predict the behavior of groups, brain regions
associated with theory-of-mind should be active both when
thinking about individuals and when thinking about group agents,
and they should be active to a similar degree. On the other hand,
to the extent that perceivers rely on different processes to
understand group agents, we should observe reduced activation
in brain regions associated with theory-of-mind—RTPJ, MPFC,
and precuneus—during consideration of groups versus individuals.
In the design of this study, steps were taken to (a) minimize, as
much as possible, the likelihood that participants would simply
consider the minds of individual group members when considering
group agents and (b) test sensitively the degree to which brain
regions associated with theory of mind are engaged during
consideration of group agents. Unlike past studies, no individuals
were mentioned or shown in the group condition, and both
directed and spontaneous theory of mind tasks were included.
Moreover, the results of Experiment 1 show that perceivers do
interpret sentences about group mental states as ascribing mental
states to the group agent itself.
Although MPFC, TPJ, and precuneus have all been associated
consistently with theory-of-mind, finer-grained differences in the
response profiles of these regions facilitate predictions about their
involvement during consideration of group agents. Recent
neuroimaging research has increasingly revealed that, even when
mental state attributions to individuals are concerned, MPFC,
TPJ, and precuneus do not all respond in the same ways under the
same circumstances. In particular, there are at least two ways in
which the processes associated with purported mental state
reasoning about group agents may differ from those associated
with individual people. One is that certain properties of the type of
mental state content being attributed may differ. The other is that
certain properties of the target to whom that content is being
attributed may differ.
The RTPJ consistently demonstrates sensitivity to the type of
mental state being ascribed. Specifically, a series of studies has
demonstrated that RTPJ is selective for processing representa-
tional mental states, such as beliefs [51–55]; see [56] for review.
The RTPJ response is high when participants read stories that
describe a character’s true or false beliefs but low during stories
containing other socially salient information, such as a character’s
physical appearance, cultural background, or even internal
sensations such as hunger or fatigue [25]. Similarly, activation in
RTPJ is higher during inferences about an individual’s beliefs than
during closely matched inferences about an individual’s prefer-
ences regardless of whether such inferences are more or less
constrained by external information—a response profile that is not
shared by other regions associated with social cognition, such as
MPFC [57]. Moreover, activation in the RTPJ consistently tracks
with thinking about mental contents, not merely seeing mental
state words. RTPJ becomes engaged when participants think
about others’ mental states even in the absence of any mental state
words, such as when they view non-verbal cartoons [58] or read
descriptions of actions that imply a particular mental state [22].
Conversely, mental state words alone do not elicit activation in the
RTPJ; for review see [59]. Thus, mental state words are neither
necessary nor sufficient for eliciting RTPJ activation. Instead,
Figure 1. Mean agreement with mental state ascriptions by
condition for the Members-Only and Group-Only vignettes.
Error bars show SE mean. Dotted black line indicates neutral midpoint;
points above indicate agreement and points below indicate disagree-
ment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105341.g001
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RTPJ activation during social cognition appears to be associated
with the ascription of representational mental state content; for
discussion see [60–62]. Thus, to the extent that perceivers attribute
representational mental states to group agents, we should observe
similar levels of RTPJ activation during consideration of group
agents and individuals, both of which should exceed that
associated with a non-mental control condition.
In contrast, MPFC appears to be especially sensitive to the
target of mental state ascription. In particular, thinking about
oneself, a similar individual, a familiar individual, or an individual
whose perspective one has taken earlier is associated with more
MPFC activation than thinking about more distant others [63–
67]. MPFC also appears to be sensitive to the target of
consideration when theory-of-mind is not explicitly called for.
For example, this region exhibits less activation during consider-
ation of ‘‘dehumanized’’ than ‘‘humanized’’ individuals [68] and
responds more during consideration of one’s own versus another
person’s physical attributes [26]. Although it remains open to
further inquiry whether lower MPFC response in these cases
genuinely indexes a difference in the degree to which mental states
are attributed [68] or rather the use of an alternative process for
doing so [57,63,67], the sensitivity of MPFC to the target of
judgment suggests that group agents may be particularly likely to
be associated with lower activation than individuals in this region.
Method
Participants. Nineteen right-handed, native English speakers
(10 female; age range 19-25, mean age 21 years) with no history of
neurological problems participated for payment. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Ethics statement. This study was approved by the Com-
mittee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects
(COUHES) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All
participants provided written informed consent.
Stimuli and Behavioral Procedure. Directed theory-of-
mind task. During fMRI scanning, participants completed an
individual vs. group agent theory-of-mind task in which they read
short statements about everyday events. Participants were
instructed to read each statement and were told that they would
be asked a series of questions about the statements later on in the
experiment. Inanimate (control) statements communicated infor-
mation without reference to people (e.g., ‘‘Although there wasn’t
much real data on agricultural production, the statistics showed
that rutabaga production was consistently going down.’’). Based on
each control statement, an individual statement and a group
statement were constructed. Individual statements concerned a
single person’s mental state (e.g., ‘‘Although there wasn’t much
real data on agricultural production, George Hailwood was sure
that rutabaga production was going down.’’). Group statements
concerned the ‘mental state’ of a group agent (e.g., ‘‘Although
there wasn’t much real data on agricultural production, United
Food Corp. was sure that rutabaga production was going down.’’).
No participant viewed more than one version of the same base
statement.
In each run of this task, participants read statements organized
around a single theme (e.g., one run concerned George Hailwood,
United Food Corp., and food production, whereas another
concerned Stephanie Ann Majors, a record company, and music
sales). For full texts of the stimuli, see (Text S2). Participants
completed ten functional runs of eighteen statements each (six per
condition), totaling 180 trials. Statements were displayed in
random order within each run and remained onscreen for 8 s.
Trials were separated by a variable inter-stimulus interval (2–16 s)
during which participants passively viewed a black screen.
Spontaneous theory-of-mind task. Following each run of
the directed theory-of-mind task, participants were asked to make
a series of predictions about the individual and group about which
they had just read (e.g., ‘‘The asparagus might be contaminated by
bacteria. Would George Hailwood [United Food Corp.] be more
likely to (a) recall all of the asparagus or (b) cover up the whole
incident?’’). This task elicited mental state reasoning indirectly by
asking participants to formulate predictions about behavior, such
that no mental state words were presented to participants at any
point. Each question remained onscreen for 12 s, and participants
were obliged to respond during that time by pressing one of two
buttons on a button box held in the left hand. Each run comprised
eight trials (four per condition) separated by 10 s. Each participant
answered each question either for the individual or the group, but
not both (question assignment randomized across participants).
Theory-of-mind localizer. In order to facilitate region-of-
interest (ROI) analyses focusing on brain regions associated with
theory-of-mind, participants also completed a functional localizer
task in which they read short narratives and made inferences about
individual protagonists’ beliefs (e.g., concerning the location of a
hidden object) and inferences about physical representations (e.g.,
the contents of an outdated photograph [22]). Each narrative was
displayed for 10 s and was followed by a statement that
participants judged as true or false (e.g., Belief story: ‘‘Sarah
thinks her shoes are under the dress’’; Physical story: ‘‘The original
photograph shows the apple on the ground’’) which remained
onscreen for 4 s. Participants were obliged to respond during that
time by pressing one of two buttons. Trials were separated by 12 s
fixation. Participants completed four runs, each of which
comprised eight trials (four per condition), for a total of 32 trials.
Imaging Procedure. fMRI data were collected using a 3
Tesla Siemens scanner. Functional imaging used a gradient-echo
echo-planar pulse sequence (TR = 2 s; TE = 30 ms; flip angle =
90u, 30 near-axial slices, 4 mm thick, in-plane resolution =
363 mm, whole brain coverage). These sequences used PACE
online motion correction for movement , 8 mm. fMRI data were
preprocessed and analyzed using SPM2 (Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, United Kingdom) and custom
software. Data from each subject were motion corrected and
normalized into a standard anatomical space based on the ICBM
152 brain template (Montreal Neurological Institute). Normalized
data were then spatially smoothed (5 mm full-width-at-half-
maximum [FWHM]) using a Gaussian kernel.
Statistical analyses were performed using the general linear
model in which the event-related design was modeled using a
canonical hemodynamic response function and other covariates of
no interest (a session mean and a linear trend). After these analyses
were performed individually for each participant, the resulting
contrast images for each participant (i.e., individual . control,
group. control) were entered into a second-level analysis in which
participants were treated as a random effect. Data were
thresholded at p,.001, k.10, uncorrected.
For the directed theory of mind task, conjunction analysis was
performed following the procedure described by Cabeza, Dolcos,
Graham, & Nyberg [69]. Whole-brain statistical maps were
created from the individual . control and group . control
contrasts separately to identify voxels activated by each condition
(thresholded individually at p , .01), making for a conjoint
threshold of p , .001.
ROIs were defined for each subject individually based on a
whole-brain analysis of the theory-of-mind localizer in three
regions: RTPJ, precuneus, and MPFC. Regions were defined as 10
or more contiguous voxels that were significantly more active (p ,
0.001, uncorrected) during stories about mental states than during
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control stories about physical representations. The average
responses relative to rest during the individual and group
conditions were then estimated in these regions. Within each
ROI, the mean percent signal change (PSC =1006 raw BOLD
magnitude for [condition 2 rest]/raw BOLD magnitude for rest)
was calculated for each condition at each time point (averaging
across all voxels in the ROI and all trials of the same condition)
and averaged across seconds 6–10 to account for hemodynamic
lag. Individual subject means for each condition of each task are
available as (Table S2). The full fMRI dataset is available upon
request.
Results
Directed theory-of-mind task. In order to assess the extent
to which common cognitive processes subserve thinking about the
minds of individuals and groups, we first conducted whole-brain,
random effects analyses of BOLD signal. In whole-brain analyses,
activation when participants contemplated the mental states of
both individuals and groups (compared to control) was observed in
brain regions associated with theory-of-mind, including MPFC,
RTPJ, and precuneus. The direct comparisons between the
individual and group conditions (individual ,. group) yielded no
areas of differential activation in regions typically associated with
social cognition (Table 1). To the extent that overlapping BOLD
activation reflects the engagement of overlapping cognitive
processes, these initial observations suggest that thinking about
individuals and groups may draw upon shared theory-of-mind
processes.
Next, to test more directly the extent to which overlapping
regions of cortex were recruited during contemplation of the
mental states of individuals and groups, we conducted a
conjunction analysis on the individual . control and group .
control contrasts. This analysis revealed conjoint activation
specifically in brain regions associated with theory-of-mind–
MPFC, right and left TPJ, and precuneus–suggesting further that
thinking about individuals and groups draw upon shared processes
(Table 2; Fig. 2).
Although the foregoing analyses suggest that similar processes
subserve thinking about individuals and groups as compared to a
control condition, they leave open the possibility that thinking
about individual and group agents may recruit theory-of-mind
processes to different degrees. In order to evaluate the degree to
which processes associated with theory-of-mind were recruited
when thinking about individuals versus groups, we conducted
independent region-of-interest (ROI) analyses within the regions of
MPFC, RTPJ, and precuneus identified by the independent
theory-of-mind localizer. Because the mental states in the localizer
task were attributed to individual protagonists, this analysis
technique provides a particularly stringent test for whether
thinking about group agents genuinely recruits processes associ-
ated with thinking about individuals. Consistent with previous
research, the theory-of-mind localizer (belief . photo contrast)
yielded activation in MPFC (17/19 participants), RTPJ (19/19
participants), and precuneus (19/19 participants); Fig. 3. First,
ROI analyses of the main task confirmed that each of these regions
showed greater activation in the individual condition than in the
control condition (MPFC, t(16) = 2.28, p , .04, d = 0.57; Right
TPJ, t(18) = 2.43, p , .03, d = 0.57; precuneus, t(18) = 5.99, p ,
.0001, d = 1.41). Second, ROI analyses further revealed that each
of these regions showed greater activation in the group condition
as compared to control (MPFC, t(16) = 2.22, p , .04, d = 0.55;
Right TPJ, t(18) = 2.39, p, .03, d = 0.56; precuneus, t(18) = 6.32,
p , .0001, d = 1.49). Finally, no significant differences were
observed between the responses to individuals versus groups in any
of these regions, (MPFC, t(16) = 0.69, p = .5; Right TPJ,
t(18) = 0.09, p = .93; precuneus, t(18) = 1.51, p = .15; Fig. 3).
Together, these analyses suggest that brain regions associated with
theory-of-mind are recruited to a highly similar degree during the
contemplation of individuals and groups.
Spontaneous theory-of-mind task. The design of the
previous task raises the possibility that activation during the
individual and group conditions may have differed from the
control condition due to the explicit use of mental state words (e.g.,
thinks, believes, wants) in the individual and group conditions. To
explore whether common theory-of-mind processes subserve
attributions to individuals and groups even when no mental state
terms are used, we analyzed data from the portion of the study
during which participants made predictions about the behavior of
individuals and groups. Specifically, we compared activation
during the individual and group conditions of the prediction task
in the same regions of RTPJ, MPFC, and precuneus identified by
the theory-of-mind localizer. Results replicated those from the
directed theory-of-mind task. Consistent with the hypothesis that
thinking about the minds of individuals and groups recruit similar
theory-of-mind processes, activations above baseline were ob-
served across the network in both the individual, t(19) = 2.84, p,
.02, d = 0.65, and the group condition, t(19) = 2.23, p , .04, d
= 0.51 (averaging across regions), and no differences were
observed between the individual and group conditions in RTPJ
(Mind = 2.004 Mgroup = 2.019, t(19) = 0.86, p . .39), MPFC
(Mind = .197 Mgroup = .180, t(19) = 0.36, p . .72), or precuneus
(Mind = .266 Mgroup = .231, t(19) = 1.64, p . .12). For
individual subject data, see (Table S2). These results suggest that
the similar patterns of activation in the individual and group
conditions observed in the first task are not simply due to the
common use of mental state terms in those conditions. Here, when
no mental state terms were presented, making predictions about
individual and group agents’ behavior also recruited the theory-of-
mind network to an indistinguishable degree.
Discussion
In describing corporations, government agencies and other
organizations, people sometimes use sentences of the form ‘Apple
thinks…’ or ‘The CIA wants…’ The aim of the present
investigation was to help illuminate how people think about group
agents. The results of Experiment 1 indicate that sentences like
these are ascribing something to the group agent itself. Perceivers
used expressions like ‘believes’ and ‘wants,’ not merely to talk
about some or all of the individual members of a group, but to talk
about the group agent. Thus, attributions to the group sometimes
diverged from attributions to the individual members: participants
were willing to attribute a state to the group itself even when they
were not willing to attribute that state to any of the individual
members, and they were willing to attribute a mental state to all
members of a group even when they were not willing to attribute
that state to the group itself. In turn, the results of Experiment 2
reveal that that such ascriptions recruit brain regions associated
with thinking about the minds of individuals, i.e., brain regions
associated with theory-of-mind, both when theory-of-mind use is
called for explicitly and when it arises spontaneously.
Past research has demonstrated consistent engagement of a
particular network of regions, including MPFC, RTPJ, and
precuneus, during inferences about the minds of individual people,
i.e., during theory-of-mind. Across two tasks, we observed
activation in this network when participants read or made
predictions about group agents. In the directed theory-of-mind
task, participants read about the states of individuals, group agents,
and inanimate objects. In the spontaneous theory-of-mind task,
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participants made predictions about what individual or group
agents would do in particular situations. In both cases, activation
associated with groups was indistinguishable from that associated
with consideration of individuals. Whole-brain analyses, conjunc-
tion analysis, and ROI analyses all support the conclusion that
cognitive processes associated with thinking about the minds of
Table 1. Regions emerging from whole brain analyses.
Region x y z T value
Theory-of-mind Localizer (Belief . Photo)
PC 2 264 42 10.73
Right TPJ 58 254 34 6.38
MPFC 0 52 46 6.27
Right STS 56 226 210 5.74
Left TPJ 248 252 20 5.39
Left Anterior STS 254 4 224 5.00
Left STS 254 220 214 4.64
Right Temporal Pole 54 6 234 4.51
Left Temporal Pole 236 16 226 4.39
Individual . Control
PC 26 268 38 8.73
Right TPJ 48 258 34 6.66
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 230 54 4 6.22
Left Inferior Parietal Lobule 240 266 42 6.04
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 56 20 36 4.20
Orbitofrontal cortex 4 50 218 4.27*
MPFC 22 52 40 4.13*
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 260 230 210 3.97
Group . Control
PC 2 262 36 7.76
Right TPJ 54 264 32 5.75
Right Temporal Pole 46 16 232 5.71
MPFC 26 54 42 4.85
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 44 24 28 4.65
Left Inferior Parietal Lobule 244 266 42 4.44
MPFC 210 42 50 4.27
Individual + Group . Control
PC 0 260 36 8.45
Right TPJ 48 258 32 6.32
Left Inferior Parietal Lobule 242 266 42 5.60
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 232 54 6 5.17
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 44 24 28 4.94
MPFC 26 56 44 4.73
Individual . Group
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 36 54 6 5.25
Right Posterior Middle Frontal Gyrus 26 12 50 4.87
Left Inferior Parietal Lobule 246 256 58 4.32
Group . Individual
Right Middle Occipital Gyrus 44 280 14 4.81
Right Fusiform Gyrus 36 274 214 4.69
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 252 4 40 4.25
Left Posterior Middle Temporal Gyrus 254 256 2 4.04
Average peak voxels for regions identified in whole-brain random effects analysis (p , .001, k . 10 voxels; * = p , .005, k . 10 voxels) of the localizer and directed
individual vs. group theory-of-mind task in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. TPJ = temporal parietal junction; PC = precuneus; MPFC = medial
prefrontal cortex; STS = superior temporal sulcus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105341.t001
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individuals were also recruited when participants thought about
the ‘mind’ of a group agent. However, it is worth noting the
possibility that participants may have been thinking to some
degree about the minds of individual group members, and that this
may have accounted for the observed activation in theory-of-mind
regions during consideration of group agents. This possibility is
weakened, but not completely ruled out, by (a) the fact that, unlike
past studies, no individuals were mentioned or shown in the group
condition and (b) the observation that perceivers interpret
sentences about group mental states as ascribing mental states to
the group agent itself in Experiment 1, and (c) the recent
observation that the more perceivers think about the ‘mind’ of the
group, the less they think about the minds of its members [8].
Past research has documented the selectivity of the RTPJ for
attributing representational mental content, such as beliefs and
intentions, to others [22,25,57,61,62], compared to other sorts of
attributions, such as those concerning a person’s physical
appearance, preferences, or personality traits. In this research,
neither the mere presence of a person nor the need to make other
types of inferences about that person was associated with as much
activation in this region as attributing representational mental
states. Accordingly, the fact that the RTPJ activated indistinguish-
ably during consideration of individuals and groups (but distin-
guished both from the inanimate control condition) is an especially
compelling suggestion that participants used similar processes for
understanding the representational mental states of individuals
and group agents.
Although the specific contributions of MPFC to social cognition
remain uncertain, this region has been observed to be sensitive to
the target of mental state ascription. In particular, greater MPFC
activation has been associated with interpersonally close others
[63–67], and with humanized others [68], compared to those who
are more distant or dehumanized. Accordingly, it would not have
been surprising to observe reduced MPFC response to group
agents compared to individuals. However, the current study
observed indistinguishable engagement during consideration of
group agents and individuals in a region of MPFC involved in
attributing mental states to individuals, as identified by the theory-
of-mind localizer, and similar to regions of MPFC associated with
mentalizing or theory-of-mind in past studies (according to
Neurosynth [70]). Moreover, the individual condition and group
condition were associated with greater MPFC activation than the
inanimate control condition, suggesting that MPFC’s contribu-
tions to individual-oriented social cognition are also present during
social cognition concerning group agents.
More generally, an abundance of past research has observed
greater engagement of brain regions associated with theory-of-
mind when perceivers think about certain types of target entities
Figure 2. Conjunction analyses. Top: A conjunction analysis
revealed conjoint activation in MPFC, TPJ (bilaterally), and precuneus
when participants read about the mental states of individuals and
groups, compared to a non-mental control condition. Bottom: These
regions also overlapped with those recruited by the theory-of-mind
localizer. Activations are displayed on a canonical brain image.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105341.g002
Table 2. Regions emerging from the conjunction analysis.
Region X y Z
PC 0 260 36
Right TPJ 48 260 32
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 44 24 28
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 52 16 46
MPFC 12 56 10
MPFC 26 54 42
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 228 52 10
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 238 54 22
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 252 20 38
Left Anterior Superior Temporal Gyrus 234 6 224
Left TPJ 252 266 28
Left Inferior Parietal Lobule 242 266 42
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 260 228 210
Average peak voxels for regions identified in whole-brain conjunction analysis of the individual . control and group . control contrasts (p , .01 for each) in Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates. TPJ = temporal parietal junction; PC = precuneus; MPFC = medial prefrontal cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105341.t002
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(humans and, to some degree, other animals) than when they think
about other types of target entities (computers, food, furniture); for
reviews, see [71–73]. Here, we find just as much activation in
brain regions associated with theory-of-mind when people think
about group agents as when they think about individual humans,
yet a group agent is something very different from a human being
or animal, or even from a collection of human beings.
Accordingly, the current results are consistent with the possibility
that perceivers apply theory-of-mind generally to things that
conform to a certain kind of abstract structure [13,74], and that
group agents turn out to be among the things that conform to that
structure [75]. This possibility draws further support from recent
research observing activation in brain regions associated with
theory-of-mind during consideration of other non-human agents
that display human-like properties [76–78] and is broadly
consistent with the observation that brain regions engaged when
people construct representations of others’ mental states are also
engaged when people construct other types of representations that
are removed from their current, first-person experience, such as
representations of the past or future [79–82].
In sum, people appear in certain respects to treat groups as
‘entities’ [47]. They assign moral blame to whole organizations as
a whole [1], treat whole financial markets as though they have
minds of their own [83], and give corporations many of the legal
rights enjoyed by individual human beings [4]. In the current
studies, we observed that perceivers were willing to attribute
mental states to group agents that they did not attribute to the
individual members of those groups, and that attributing mental
states to group agents was associated with activation in the same
brain regions that support ascriptions of mental states to individual
people (as confirmed by an independent localizer task). Taken
together, these results suggest that in order to understand the
striking ways in which people reason about corporations,
governments, and other group agents, it may be important to
consider the possibility that perceivers sometimes attribute mental
states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions not only to the
members of such groups but also to the group agent itself.
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